A note on utility-based pricing in models with transaction costs by Davis, MHA & Yoshikawa, D
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031313
A note on utility-based pricing in models with transaction costs
Mark H.A. Davisand Daisuke Yoshikaway
September 13, 2010
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the utility indierence pricing and utility-based pricing in the market
with transaction costs. The utility maximization problem including contingent claims in the market
with transaction costs has been considered by Bouchard(2002)[3]. Following his results, we consider
the market equilibrium of contingent claims. In order to do this, specifying the utility function as
exponential utility, we deduce the equilibrium in the market with transaction costs. Unlike Davis
and Yoshikawa(2010)[7], we have to assume a strong assumption to deduce zero trade equilibrium
in a market with transaction costs. It implies that transaction costs can generate a non-zero trade
equilibrium under weak assumption.
1 Introduction
Friction caused by transaction costs is one of the biggest problems for analyzing the market, because of
the diculty of handling it. However, as summarized in Kabanov and Safarian(2010)[14], since many
authors have developed the theory of the market with transaction costs, nowadays, we have an abundance
of studies in this eld. Like Kabanov and Safarian(2010)[14], we think the main topics of the theory of the
market with transaction costs are approximative hedging, arbitrage theory, and consumption-investment
problems. If we consider contingent claims in the market with transaction costs (this problem might be
included in consumption-investment problems), the major issue is tackling the super hedging and utility
maximization problems. In this paper, we deal with the utility maximization problem of wealth including
contingent claims. More precisely, our purpose is not directly dealing with the utility maximization, but
embedding wealth with transaction costs into the utility indierence framework and the framework of
the utility-based pricing and deducing the equilibrium in the market with transaction costs. The utility
maximization problem in the market with transaction costs has developed in several ways. However,
every study has derived from the standard framework formulated by Kabanov and Last(2002)[13]. Fol-
lowing this framework, papers of Bouchard (e.g. Bouchard(2000)[2], Bouchard(2001)[4], and Bouchard
et, al.(2002)[3]) gave us a signicant result about the utility maximization including contingent claims,
especially, `liquidation function', which is a tool to express the total wealth in the market with transaction
costs. This is a very useful and strong concept to deduce the solution for the utility maximization prob-
lem. Further studies have since been developed to overcome problems related to Kabanov and Bouchard's
models; e.g. introducing a bid-ask process which is a generalized concept of transaction matrix and de-
ned as a stochastic process, expansion of the utility function from one dimensional to multi dimensional
function, or considering a more expanded setting of utility function, like Kamizono(2004)[15], Campi and
Owen(2010)[5] or Benedetti and Campi(2011[1].
Our research is based on Bouchard(2002)[3], because, in this paper, he proved the existence of the
solution for the utility maximization problem including contingent claims. Our purpose is not to tackle the
utility maximization problem in a more general and abstract setting, but to deduce the equilibrium in the
market with transaction costs. Fortunately, Campi and Owen(2010)[5] and Benedetti and Campi(2011)[1]
proved the existence of the solution of the utility maximization problem using the multivariate utility
function with transaction costs described by the general bid-ask processes with jumps. We believe that
our method to deduce the equilibrium is applicable in the more general setting, because the form of
the solution of utility maximization of Campi and Owen(2010)[5] and Benedetti and Campi(2011)[1] is
essentially the same as the one presented by Bouchard(2002)[3]. Our method to deduce the equilibrium
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is as follows; by specifying the utility function as an exponential function, we could deduce the clear
relationship between the quantity of the contingent claim and the corresponding utility. The most
important thing which we found is that the utility indierence price and utility-based price at the point
where the quantity is zero are given independently of the risk-aversion of each investor. Using this fact,
we can easily deduce the equilibrium in the market with transaction costs.
This paper is divided into three parts. In the rst part, we set the model of the market with transaction
costs and give an overview of the result of Bouchard(2001)[3]. In the next section, we deduce the
equilibrium in the market with the transaction costs under the framework of indierence pricing and
utility-based pricing. The last section is attributed for concluding remarks.
2 Model, overviews and setting of our problem about the mar-
ket with transaction costs
Following Kabanov and Last(2002)[13], for the initial capital x 2 Rd, the strategy L and a continuous
semimartingale Si, we dene the portfolio holdings X = Xx;L 2 Rd+ by the dynamics,
Xit = x
i + X^i   Sit +
Pd
j=1(L
ji
t   (1 + ij)Lijt ); i; j = 1;    ; d;
where Xi is the i-the factor of X, X^i := Xi=Si, X^i   Sit is the stochastic integral of X^i  with respect to
Si, Lijt is the cumulative net amount of funds transferred from the asset i to the asset j up to the date
t, L0  = 0, and the matrix (ij) 2 Md, the set of square matrices with d-lines and non-negative entries,
represents the constant proportional costs with zero diagonal which satisfy
(1 + ij)  (1 + ik)(1 + kj) 8i; j; k 2 f0;    ; dg:
We dene the solvency region (see, e.g. Kabanov(1999)[12]),
K := fx 2 Rd; 9a 2Md; xi +
dX
j=1
(aji   (1 + ij)aij)  0; i = 0;    ; dg;
For this closed convex cone, we can dene a partial ordering on Rd such that,
x1  x2 if and only if x1   x2 2 K:
A trading strategy L is said to be -admissible for the initial holdings x 2 K if, for a constant   0, the
no-bankruptcy condition holds,
Xx;Lt   St:
We shall denote by A(x) the set of all -admissible trading strategies for the initial holdings x 2 K and
we introduce the set
X (x) := fX 2 L0(Rd+1;FT ) : X = Xx;LT for some L 2 [0A(x)g;
where we x T as a nite time horizon. This set implicitly denote X 2 X (x) is uniformly bounded from
below.
Our purpose is to formulate the indierence pricing in the market with transaction costs, which is
based on the utility maximization for Xx;LT . For evaluating the expected utility about X
x;L
T , we dene
liquidation value and utility function. Let 11 := (1; 0;    ; 0), 1 := (1;    ; 1), and
l(x) := supfr 2 R : x  r11g;
which is called a liquidation function.
We dene the utility function U : R ! R as a C1-strictly increasing, strictly concave function, and
satisfying a condition as follows,
lim
r!1U
0(r) = 0; lim
r! 1U
0(r) =1:
We x a contingent claim B which is a bounded d-dimensional FT -measurable random variable, assuming
that B   cST for some c 2 R.
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Using the liquidation function, we can construct the utility indierence framework,
sup
Xx;L2X (x)
EU [l(Xx;L)] = sup
Xx+p(B;x;q)q;L2X (x+qp(B;x;q)11)
EU [l(Xx+qp(B;x;q)11;L   qB)]; (1)
where p(B;x; q) is the utility indierence price (Bouchard et al.(2001)[4], Bouchard(2002)[3], and Henderson(2002)[9]
calls this price as reservation price) and q is the quantity of the contingent claim B. Theorem 7 of
Bouchard(2002)[3] proves that the existence of the solution of left hand side of the above equation1.
Since we can easily deduce that the existence theorem holds in the case of q = 0 by reading carefully the
proof of Theorem 7 of Bouchard(2002)[3], the existence of the solution of right hand side holds, although
the existence is independently proved by Cvitanic and Wang(2001)[6]
Furthermore, Theorem 7 of Bouchard(2002)[3] characterizes the solution of the problem supXL2X (x) EU [l(Xx;L 
Bq)] by using the dual problem. To set up the dual problem, we need to dene the positive polar of K
such that,
K := fy 2 Rd : x>y  0; 8x 2 Kg:
Hereafter, we assume that Int(K) 6= ;. We need to dene the subset of X (x) such that,
X+(x) := fXx;LT : L 2 A0(x); t  Tg:
Based on this subset, we dene three convex cones as follows,
Y+ := f(y; Y ) 2 K  L0(FT ;K) : E[Y X]  yx; 8x 2 K; X 2 X+(x)g;
YV+ := f(y; Y ) 2 Y+ : E[Y 1] = y1; V (Y 1) 2 L1g;
YV++ := f(y; Y ) 2 YV+ : P (Y 1 = 0) = 0g;
where V () is a dual function of U(). Theorem 7 of Bouchard(2002) shows that, for the dual problem
wq(x) := inf(y;Y )2YV+ E[V (Y
1) + y>x  qY >B], there exists the solution (y^x;q; Y^x;q) 2 YV++ such that,
wq(x) = E[V (Y^ 1x;q) + y^>x;qx  qY^ >x;qB];
where Y^ 1x;q is the rst factor of Y^x;q. Using this result, Theorem 7 of Bouchard(2002) deduces the solution
of uq(x) = supXx;L2X (x) EU [l(Xx;L  Bq)] as follows,
X^x;q = I(Y
1
x;q)11 + qB 2 X (x);
where I := (U 0) 1.
3 Equilibrium in the market with transaction costs
We specify the utility function as U(r) :=  e r, which implies V (r0) = r0 ln

r0


  r0 . From the
property of the Fenchel transform, the domain of V (r0) is given by r0  0. Therefore,
wq(x) = inf
(y;Y )2YV+
E

Y 1

ln

Y 1


  Y
1

+ y>x  qY >B

:
Let MX (x) be the set of super martingale for X 2 X+(x) and for all Q 2 MX (x) the relative entropy
H[QjP ] <1 which implies that V (Y 1) 2 L1. From the denition of Y+, for a super martingale measure
1By introducing XU (x), Bouchard proves the existence of the solution under more loose condition; that is, he proves
the problem supXL2XU (x) EU [l(X
x;L  Bq)]. The denition of XU (x) is given as follow; for X 2 L0(FT ;Rd), which is the
member of XU (x), there exists a sequence (Xk)k 2 X (x) such that,
Xk ! X P   a:s: and E[U(l(Xk  B))]! E[U(l(X  B))]; as k !1:
It is clear that supXL2X (x) EU [l(Xx;L  Bq)] = supXL2XU (x) EU [l(Xx;L  Bq)].
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Q 2MX (x), we can write Y = dQdP y 2 L0(FT ;K).
wq(x) = inf
y2K;Q2MX(x)
E

y1

dQ
dP
ln

y1

dQ
dP

  y
1

dQ
dP
+
dQ
dP
y>(x  qB)

= inf
y2Rd;Q2MX(x)
E

y1

dQ
dP
ln

dQ
dP

+
y1

dQ
dP
ln

y1


  y
1

dQ
dP
+
dQ
dP
y>(x  qB)

= inf
y2K;Q2MX(x)

y>

1

E

dQ
dP
ln

dQ
dP

11 + E

dQ
dP
(x  qB)

+
y1

ln

y1


  y
1


= inf
Q2MX(x)

inf
y2K

y>

1

E

dQ
dP
ln

dQ
dP

11 + E

dQ
dP
(x  qB)

+
y1

ln

y1


  y
1


:
Let y 1 := y=y1. Since y1 > 0, if y 2 K, then y 1 2 K. Therefore, we can calculate of wq(x)
continuation, as below,
wq(x) = inf
Q2MX(x)

inf
y12R+

y1 inf
y 12K

y> 1

1

E

dQ
dP
ln

dQ
dP

11 + E

dQ
dP
(x  qB)

+
y1

ln

y1


  y
1


= inf
Q2MX(x)

inf
y12R+

y1l

1

E

dQ
dP
ln

dQ
dP

11 + E

dQ
dP
(x  qB)

+
y1

ln

y1


  y
1


= inf
Q2MX(x)

inf
y12R+

y1

1

H[QjP ] + l  x+ EQ [ qB]+ y1

ln

y1


  y
1


= inf
y12R+

y1 inf
Q2MX(x)

1

H[QjP ] + l  x+ EQ [ qB]+ y1

ln

y1


  y
1


:
On line 2, we use the property of the liquidation function; l(x) = inffyx : y 2 K with y1 = 1g for
x 2 Rd (c.f. Proposition 1 (i) of Bouchard(2002)[3]) and on line 3, we use the fact that, for a constant c,
l(x+ c11) = l(x) + c (see e.g. Proposition 1 (iii) of Bouchard(2002)[3], Proposition 2.1(e) of Bouchard et
al.(2001)[4], and Proposition 2.1 (iii) of Bouchard(2000)[2]). The optimal y1 is given by,
y^1x;q = e
  infQ2MX(x)f 1H[QjP ]+l(x+EQ[ qB])g:
Hereafter, we write the solution of infQ2MX(x)
n
1
H[QjP ] + l
 
x+ EQ [ qB]o as Qx;q.
From the denition of I(), I(x) =   1 ln

x


. So,
X^x;q =   1

ln
 
y^1x;q

dQx;q
dP
!
11 + qB:
Note that Remark 9 of Bouchard(2002)[3]. Then, since X (x+ qp(B;x; q)11) = X (x) + qp(B;x; q)11,
for Xx+qp(B;x;q)11;L 2 X (x+ qp(B;x; q)11),
sup
Xx+qp(B;x;q)11;L2X (x+qp(B;x;q)11)
EU [l(Xx+qp(B;x;q)11;L   qB)] = e qp(B;x;q) sup
Xx;L2X (x)
EU [l(Xx;L   qB)]:
The utility indierence framework is rewritten as,
sup
Xx;L2X (x)
EU [l(Xx;L)] = e qp(B;x;q) sup
Xx;L2X (x)
EU [l(Xx;L   qB)]:
It is equivalent to write this framework is rewritten as follows,
EU
h
l(X^x;0)
i
= e qp(B;x;q)EU
h
l(X^x;q   qB)
i
;
We dene u(Xx;L; q; ) := ln( EU [l(Xx;L   qB)]). And, u(q;x; ) := u(X^x;q; q; ), then the indier-
ence framework is,
u(0;x; ) =  p(B;x; q)q + u(q;x; )
$ u(q;x; ) = u(0;x; ) + p(B;x; q)q (2)
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Analyzing u(Xx;L; q; ), we will characterize the indierence framework in the market with transaction
costs. From the denition, u(X^x;q; q; )  u(Xx;L; q; ). For optimal X^x;~q which is the solution for the
quantity ~q,
u(X^x;~q; q; ) = ln( EU [l(X^x;~q   qB)])
= ln
 
 EU
"
l
 
  1

ln
 
y^1x;~q

dQx;~q
dP
!
11 + ~qB   qB
!#!
= ln
 
 EU
"
  1

ln
 
y^1x;~q

dQx;~q
dP
!
+ l ((~q   q)B)
#!
= ln
 
E
"
y^1x;~q

dQx;~q
dP
e l((~q q)B)
#!
= ln
 
y^1x;~q

EQ
x;~q
h
e l((~q q)B)
i!
= ln
y^1x;~q

+
(
lnEQx;~q

e (~q q)l(B)

~q  q
lnEQx;~q

e(~q q)l( B)

~q < q
(3)
where on line 3, we use the fact l(x+ c11) = l(x)+ c and on line 5, we use the fact l(cx) = cl(x) for c  0
(see Proposition 2.1 (c) of Bouchard(2001)[4]).
Lemma 3.1
u(X^x;~q; q; ) is convex function about q.
Proof For q; q0 2 R and 0  t  1,
u(X^x;~q; tq + (1  t)q0; ) = ln
y^1x;~q

+ ln

EQ
x;~q
h
e l((tq+(1 t)q
0 ~q)B)
i
= ln
y^1x;~q

+ ln

EQ
x;~q
h
e l((t(q ~q)+(1 t)(q
0 ~q))B)
i
 ln y^
1
x;~q

+ ln

EQ
x;~q
h
e l(t(q ~q)B) l((1 t)(q
0 ~q)B)
i
= ln
y^1x;~q

+ ln

EQ
x;~q
h
e tl((q ~q)B)e (1 t)l((q
0 ~q)B)
i
 ln y^
1
x;~q

+ ln

EQ
x;~q
h
e l((q ~q)B)
it
EQ
x;~q
h
e l((q
0 ~q)B)
i(1 t)
= tu(X^x;~q; q; ) + (1  t)u(X^x;~q; q0; )
On line 3, we used l(x+ y)  l(x) + l(y) for x; y 2 R (see, Proposition 2.1 (b) of Bouchard(2001)[4]). We
use Holder's inequality on line 5.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.2
For xed ~q, the function u(X^x;~q; q; ) has kink point at q = ~q. Furthermore, u(X^x;~q; q; ) is dierentiable
at q = ~q if and only if l(B) =  l( B).
Proof When ~q 6= q, the continuity of u(X^x;~q; q; ) is clear; i.e. limq#0 u(X^x;~q; q+q; ) = limq#0 u(X^x;~q; q 
q; ) for q  0 which is given independently of ~q. When ~q = q, it is also clear that u(X^x;~q; q; ) is
continuous, since limq"~q lnEQ
x;~q 
e (~q q)l(B)

= limq#~q lnEQ
x;~q 
e(~q q)l( B)

= 0.
Consider the slope of u(X^x;~q; q; ). For q > ~q,
u(X^x;~q; q +q; )  u(X^x;~q; q; )
q
=
1
q
ln
EQx;~q

e(~q q q)l( B)

EQx;~q

e(~q q)l( B)

=
1
q
lnEQ
x;~q;q
h
e ql( B)
i
 1
q
EQ
x;~q;q
[ ql ( B)] = EQx;~q;q [ l ( B)] ;
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where we used a Radon-Nikodym derivative dened such that dQx;~q;q=dQx;~q := e(~q q)l( B)=EQx;~q

e(~q q)l( B)

and Jensen's inequality. Thorough the same logic, for suciently small q such that q q > ~q, it holds
that
u(X^x;~q;q;) u(X^x;~q;q q;)
q  EQ
x;~q;q
[ l ( B)] : That is, when q  ~q, it holds,
 E
Qx;~q

l ( B) e(~q q)l( B)
EQx;~q

e(~q q)l( B)
 2 @u(X^x;~q; q; )
where @u(X^x;~q; q; ) which is subdierential of u(X^x;~q; q; ) at q, The same way is applicable for q  ~q,
so
EQx;~q

l (B) e (~q q)l( B)

EQx;~q

e (~q q)l(B)
 2 @u(X^x;~q; q; )
Therefore,
lim
q#~q
u(X^x;~q; q; )  u(X^x;~q; ~q; )
q   ~q  limq#~q  
EQx;~q

l ( B) e(~q q)l( B)
EQx;~q

e(~q q)l( B)
 = EQx;~q [ l( B)]
lim
q"~q
u(X^x;~q; q; )  u(X^x;~q; ~q; )
q   ~q  limq"~q
EQx;~q

l (B) e (~q q)l( B)

EQx;~q

e (~q q)l(B)
 = EQx;~q [l(B)]
Let 0 is the d-dimensional zero vector, then l(0) = 0. Since 0 = l(0) = l(B   B)  l(B) + l( B) (see,
Proposition 2.1 (b) of Bouchard(2001)[4]),  l( B)  l(B) Therefore,
 EQx;~q [l( B)]  EQx;~q [l(B)] : (4)
This implies that u(X^x;~q; q; ) is non-dierentiable at q = ~q.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.3
u(q;x; ) is convex function about q.
Proof For 0  t  1 and q; q0 2 R,
tu(q;x; ) + (1  t)u(q0;x; ) = tu(X^x;q; q; ) + (1  t)u(X^x;q0 ; q0; )
= t ln(Ee l(X^x;q qB)) + (1  t) ln(Ee l(X^x;q0 q0B))
= ln(Ee l(X^x;q qB))t ln(Ee l(X^x;q0 q
0B))1 t
 ln(Ee tl(X^x;q qB) (1 t)l(X^x;q0 q0B))
= ln(Ee l(tX^x;q tqB)+l((1 t)X^x;q0 (1 t)q
0B))
 ln(Ee l(tX^x;q+(1 t)X^x;q0 (tq+(1 t)q0)B))
 ln(Ee l(X^x;tq+(1 t)q0 (tq+(1 t)q0)B))
= u(tq + (1  t)q0;x; )
On line 4, we use Holder's inequality.
Q.E.D.
By (2), the utility indierence price is given by
p(B;x; q) =
1

u(q;x; )  u(0;x; )
q
:
Initial endowment x and risk-aversion  is dependent on each investor's personal situation. Therefore, the
utility indierence price p(B;x; q) is dierent from each other. Hereafter, we consider the characteristics
of the utility indierence price around q = 0.
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For deducing the utility indierence price at q = 0, we need to calculate as follows,
p(B;x; 0) = lim
q!0
p(B;x; q) =
1

lim
q!0
u(q;x; )  u(0;x; )
q
However, from Lamma 3.2, Lamma 3.1, Lamma 3.3 for q0 < 0 < q, it might be
lim
q#0
u(q;x; )  u(0;x; )
q
6= lim
q0"0
u(0;x; )  u(q0;x; )
q0
:
We consider about it.
Lemma 3.4
When q ! 0, the measure Qx;q converges to Qx;0.
Proof From the denition of H[Qx;0jP ], it holds that
H[Qx;0jP ]  lim
q!0
H[Qx;qjP ]:
We show the opposite inequality.
lim
q!0

1

H[Qx;qjP ] + l

x+ EQ
x;q
[ qB]

= lim
q!0
inf
Q2MX(x)

1

H[QjP ] + l  x+ EQ[ qB]
 lim
q!0

1

H[Qx;0jP ] + l

x+ EQ
x;0
[ qB]

=
1

H[Qx;0jP ] + l(x)
Since B is bounded, there is some constant K > 0 such that,
 qK11   qEQx;q [B]:
Therefore,
lim
q!0

1

H[Qx;qjP ] + l

x+ EQ
x;q
[ qB]

 lim
q!0

1

H[Qx;qjP ] + l(x)  qK

= lim
q!0
1

H[Qx;qjP ] + l(x);
where we use that for x; x0 2 Rd, x  x0 ! l(x)  l(x0) (c.f. Proposition 1 (iv) of Bouchard(2002)[3]).
That is,
lim
q!0
H[Qx;qjP ]  H[Qx;0jP ]:
From non-negativity and convexity of relative entropy (c.f. Theorem 1.4.1. and Theorem 1.5.1. of
Ihara(1993)[11]), if relative entropy H[Qx;qjP ] converges to H[Qx;0jP ], then Qx;q uniquely converges to
Qx;0.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.5
The utility indierence price at quantity zero, that is p(B;x; 0), exists in the range such that,
p(B;x; 0) 2

l(EQ
x;0
[B]); l( EQx;0 [B])

:
Proof From (3), u(X^x;~q; ~q; ) = ln
y^1x;~q
 . Furthermore, from the denition, u(q;x; ) = u(X^x;q; q; ) =
ln
y^1x;q
 . So, u(q;x; ) =   infQ2MX(x)
n
1
H[QjP ] + l
 
x+ EQ [ qB]o.
lim
q#0
p(B;x; q) =
1

lim
q#0
u(q;x; )  u(0;x; )
q
=   lim
q#0
infQ2MX(x)
n
1
H[QjP ] + l
 
x+ EQ [ qB]o  infQ2MX(x) n 1H[QjP ]o  l(x)
q
=   lim
q#0
infQ2MX(x)
n
1
H[QjP ] + l
 
x+ EQ [ qB]o  1H[Qx;0jP ]  l(x)
q
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From the denition, H[Qx;qjP ]  H[Qx;0jP ] and by Lemma 3.4, H[Qx;qjP ] ! H[Qx;0jP ], when
q ! 0. Therefore, using the non-negativity of relative entropy, limq!0 H[Q
x;qjP ] H[Qx;0jP ]
q = 0. Using
this fact, we can continue the calculation, as follows,
Above equation =   lim
q#0
1
H[Q
x;qjP ] + l  x+ EQx;q [ qB]  1H[Qx;0jP ]  l(x)
q
=   lim
q#0
 
H[Qx;qjP ] H[Qx;0jP ]
q
+
l
 
x+ EQx;q [ qB]  l(x)
q
!
=   lim
q#0
l
 
x+ EQx;q [ qB]  l(x)
q
   lim
q#0
l(x) + l
 
EQx;q [ qB]  l(x)
q
=   lim
q#0
l
 
EQx;q [ qB]
q
=   lim
q#0
ql
 
EQx;q [ B]
q
=   lim
q#0
l

EQ
x;q
[ B]

=  l

EQ
x;0
[ B]

Likewise, we calculate limq"0 p(B;x; q), as follows,
lim
q"0
p(B;x; q) =
1

lim
q"0
u(q;x; )  u(0;x; )
q
=   lim
q"0
l
 
x+ EQx;q [ qB]  l(x)
q
 l

EQ
x;0
[B]

;
where we use q < 0.
Q.E.D.
By Proposition 3.5, the utility indierence price at q = 0 is given independently of the risk-aversion.
Using this fact, we can attain the equilibrium in the market. Before this, we give a denition of market
equilibrium as below.
Denition 3.6
Let an economy specify the investors' preferences which is described by the utility function U :=
fUi();Ui(x) :=  e ix; i = 1;    ; ng. Each investor's wealth is dened by their portfolio hold-
ings X = Xx;L 2 Rd+ and a contingent claim B thorough the liquidation function. An allocation
q := fqi ; i = 1;    ; n; qi 2 Rg and a price p of the contingent claim B constitutes a price equilibrium if
there is an assignment such that
1. For any investor with utility function fUi; i = 1;    ; ng, when the investor holds qi -units of the
contingent claim, (p; qi ) is preferred to all other allocations (p; q
0
i); that is, an expected utility
corresponding to the allocation (p; qi ) is larger than another expected utility corresponding to the
allocation (p; q0i).
2.
Pn
i=1 q

i = 0.
Theorem 3.7
In the market with transaction costs, let every investors with dierent risk-aversions construct their
strategies according to the utility indierence pricing. Furthermore, let initial endowments x be common
for all investors, then equilibrium will be zero trade. The equilibrium price is given by p(B; 0) which
exists in the range as follows,
p(B; 0) 2

l(EQ
x;0
[B]); l( EQx;0 [B])

:
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Proof The case of q > 0 implies that the investor's strategy is selling the contingent claim B. For
q > q0 > 0,
p(B : x; q)  p(B;x; q0) = u(q;x; )  u(0;x; )
q
  u(q
0;x; )  u(0;x; )
q0
=
q0u(q;x; )  q0u(0;x; )  qu(q0;x; ) + qu(0;x; )
qq0
(5)
=
q0u(q;x; ) + (q   q0)u(0;x; )  qu(q0;x; )
qq0
=
q

q0
q u(q;x; ) +
(q q0)
q u(0;x; )

  qu(q0;x; )
qq0

qu( q
0
q q +
(q q0)
q 0;x; )  qu(q0;x; )
qq0
= 0: (6)
This means that p(B;x; q) > p(B; q0). On the other hand, for q < q0 < 0, it holds p(B;x; q) < p(B; q0).
That is, the utility indierence price is non decreasing if the investor is in sell side and the utility
indierence price is non increasing if the investor is in buy side. It is well known that the utility indierence
price is the threshold price. That is, from the sell side of contingent claims, the utility indierence price is
a minimum price and from the buy side of contingent claims, the utility indierence price is a maximum
price.
Since the utility indierence price at q = 0 is independent of risk-aversion, if initial endowments are
common for all investors, the utility indierence price p(B;x; 0) is also common for all investors. So,
utility indierence sell prices for any investor is more expensive than utility indierence buy prices for
all investors. Therefore, the equilibrium is zero trade and the equilibrium price is given by p(B;x; 0).
Q.E.D.
Remark 3.8
In the above theorem, we assume that initial endowments are common for all investors. However, if initial
endowments are dierent from each investor, utility indierence prices at q = 0 might be dierent from
each other, because they exist in each range depending on each initial endowment.
More precisely, we consider n-investors with initial endowment fxi; i = 1;    ; ng. Each utility
indierence price p(B;xi; 0) has ranges of price as p(B;xi; 0) 2

l(EQxi;0 [B]); l( EQxi;0 [B])

. Choose
x from fxi; i = 1;    ; ng and assume that for all i 2 [1; n],
 l( EQx
;0
[B])   l( EQxi;0 [B]):
Likewise, choose x and assume that for all i 2 [1; n],
l(EQ
x;0
[B])  l(EQxi;0 [B]):
Then, for initial endowments xi 6= xj , utility indierence prices p(B;xi; 0) and p(B;xj ; 0) exists
in this wide range

l(EQx;0 [B]); l( EQx;0 [B])

. However, utility indierence price p(B;xi; 0) can
be dierent from p(B;xj ; 0), because Qxi;0 might be dierent from Qxj ;0; that is, each price range
l(EQxi;0 [B]); l( EQxi;0 [B])

and

l(EQ
xj;0
[B]); l( EQxj;0 [B])

might be dierent from each other.
This implies that a equilibrium price p(B) 2

l(EQx;0 [B]); l( EQx;0 [B])

exists such that p(B;x; 0) =
p(B;xi; q) = p(B;xj ; q) for a quantity q. In this case, the equilibrium is not zero trade.
2
Theorem 3.7 is attained by the framework of indierence pricing. Hereafter, we consider the case
of utility-based price. Following Hugonnier and Kramkov(2004)[10], we dene the utility-based price
for B as the value pHK(B;x) such that the agent's holdings q in the claims are optimal in the model
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where the claims can be traded at time 0 at price pHK(B;x). That is, we need to consider the problem
supXx+pHK (B;x)q;L2X (x+qpHK(B;x)11):q2R EU [l(X
x+qpHK(B;x)11;L   qB)].
sup
Xx+qp
HK (B;x)11;L2X (x+qpHK(B;x)11);q2R
EU [l(Xx+qp
HK(B;x)11;L   qB)]
= sup
q2R
(
e qp
HK(B;x) sup
Xx;L2X (x)
EU [l(Xx;L   qB)]
)
= sup
q2R
(
e qp
HK(B;x) sup
Xx;L2X (x)

 eu(Xx;L;q;)
)
= sup
q2R

 e qpHK(B;x) inf
Xx;L2X (x)
eu(X
x;L;q;)

= sup
q2R
n
 e qpHK(B;x)einfXx;L2X(x) u(Xx;L;q;)
o
= sup
q2R
n
 e qpHK(B;x)+u(q;x;)
o
=  einfq2Rf qpHK(B;x)+u(q;x;)g:
Therefore, it is sucient to consider the problem infq2R
 qpHK(B;x) + u(q;x; )	. Since u(q;x; )
is proper convex function (that is, u(q;x; ) < 1 for at least one q and u(q;x; ) >  1 for every q), if
 pHK(B;x) 2 @u(q;x; ), then  qpHK(B;x)+u(q;x; ) achieves its inmum at q = q from Theorem
23.5 of Rockafeller(1970)[16]. Using this principle, we can attain the equilibrium.
Theorem 3.9
In the market with transaction costs, let every investors with dierent risk-aversions construct their
strategies according to the utility-based pricing. Furthermore, initial endowment x are common for all
investors. Then the equilibrium is zero trade and the equilibrium price is given by p(B) which exists in
the range as follows,
p(B) 2

l(EQ
~x;0
[B]); l( EQx;0 [B])

:
Proof From the denition of subdierential, any q 2 @u(q;x; ) satises that u(q0;x;) u(q;x;)q0 q  q for
q0 2 (0; q) (if q0 > q, u(q0;x;) u(q;x;)q0 q  q) and any 0 2 @u(0;x; ) satises that
u(q0;x;) u(0;x;)
q0 0  0.
That is, if u(q0;x;) u(q;x;)q0 q >
u(q0;x;) u(0;x;)
q0 0 , @u(q;x; ) \ @u(0;x; ) = ;.
Consider the case of q > 0. For q0 2 (0; q),
u(q0;x; )  u(q;x; )
q0   q  
u(q;x; )  u(0;x; )
q   0
=
qu(q0;x; )  qu(q;x; )  (q0   q)u(q;x; ) + (q0   q)u(0;x; )
q(q0   q)
=
 q0u(q;x; ) + (q0   q)u(0;x; ) + qu(q0;x; )
q(q0   q)
=
 q

q0
q u(q;x; ) +
q q0
q u(0;x; )

+ qu(q0;x; )
q(q0   q)

 qu

q0
q q +
q q0
q 0;x; 

+ qu(q0;x; )
q(q0   q) = 0:
From (6), for q0 2 (0; q), u(q;x;) u(0;x;)q 0  u(q0;x;) u(0;x;)q0 0 . Therefore, for q0 2 (0; q), it holds that
u(q0;x; )  u(q;x; )
q0   q 
u(q0;x; )  u(0;x; )
q0   0 :
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Therefore, even if @u(q;x; )\ @u(0;x; ) 6= ;, the utility-based price at q > 0 is not smaller than the
utility-based price at q = 0. The same logic is valid for the case q < 0. Therefore, the utility-based prices
for sell side (q > 0) and the utility-based price for buy side (q < 0) are separated for all investors.
However, from the proof of Proposition 3.5, @u(0;x; ) 2

l(EQx;0 [B]); l( EQx;0 [B])

, which
implies the equilibrium price exists between this range. Therefore, likewise Theorem 3.7, if initial endow-
ments x are common for all investors, the equilibrium is given by zero trade, since the utility-based price
given by @u(0;x; ) is common for all investors.
Q.E.D.
Remark 3.10
One of the most natural expansions of the above model with transaction costs is to include randomness
and time into transaction matrix (ij); that is, considering (ij(t; !)). In Kabanov(1999)[12], this was
indirectly introduced as bid-ask processes (ijt ) 2 t which were formulated by Schachermayer(2004)[17].
It is also possible to consider the model where asset processes are not necessarily continuous. In such a
model, utility maximization problem has been considered by Campi and Owen (2010)[5] and Benedetti
and Campi (2011)[1]. Although the utility function adopted by them is not dened on the whole real line,
their model is, in a sense, generalized version of Bouchard (2002)[3]. Fortunately, the utility maximization
problem in the model of Campi and Owen (2010)[5] and Benedetti and Campi (2011)[1] has the solution
and the form of the solution is essentially same as the form of the solution of Bouchard (2002)[3]. This
implies that our equilibrium approach will be applicable for the model formulated by Schachermayer
(2004), Campi and Owen (2010)[5] and Benedetti and Campi (2011)[1]. However, our approach to
deduce the equilibrium in the generalized model will be done in future research, because our purpose
in this paper is to deduce the feature of the equilibrium in the model with transaction costs by using a
simple way.
4 Concluding remarks
Davis and Yoshikawa(2010)[7] and Davis and Yoshikawa(2011)[8] shows that, if there is no friction through
transaction costs, the equilibrium will be zero trade in the utility indierence framework and utility-based
framework. Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.9 shows that the equilibrium is zero trade even in the market
with transaction costs. However, these results are under the assumption that initial endowments are
common for all investors. If we abandon this strong assumption, non zero-trade equilibrium will appear,
by embedding transaction costs into the market model. Transaction costs are usually regarded as obstacles
for market liquidity. However, we nd that transaction costs can generate the non zero-trade equilibrium.
It implies that transaction costs are not necessarily obstacles for making liquidity in a market. In this
sense, we think this is interesting implication.
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